Assessing the risk to inflation from inflation expectations by Macallan, Clare et al.
100 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q2
Introduction
Over the past three years, inflation, measured by the annual
change in the consumer prices index (CPI), has frequently been
more than 1 percentage point above the 2% target set by the
Government and has averaged 3.2% during that period
(Chart 1).  The elevated rate of inflation reflects the temporary
effects of a number of factors including:  increases in food and
energy prices;  higher import prices following the substantial
depreciation in sterling;  and increases in the standard rate of
VAT.  The outlook is highly uncertain, but the Monetary Policy
Committee (MPC) judges that inflation is likely to remain
elevated throughout the remainder of 2011, before falling back
during 2012 as the temporary effects wane and downward
pressure from spare capacity persists.(2)
There is a risk that recent high inflation outturns might prompt
households, companies and financial market participants to
expect inflation to persist above the target.  That might
happen if they believe that the MPC has become more tolerant
of deviations of inflation from target in the near term than is in
fact the case.  Or individuals might have doubts about the
willingness or ability of the MPC to return inflation to target in
the medium term.  In either case, expectations of inflation
would have become less well anchored by the monetary policy
framework.
If inflation expectations were to become less well anchored,
inflation itself might become more persistent.  That might
occur through a change in price-setting or wage-setting
behaviour.  For example, if companies were to believe that
inflation would remain above the target for longer, then they
might raise the prices of the goods and services that they
produce by more, or more frequently, than they otherwise
would.  And they might become more willing to grant
increases in wages, because they would expect to be able to
raise the prices that they charge their customers.  An increase
in the persistence of inflation, other things being equal, would
mean that returning inflation to target would require the MPC
to tighten monetary policy by more than it otherwise would.
This article discusses how a range of indicators may be used to
monitor inflation expectations and price and wage-setting
behaviour.  The first section explains why it would be costly if
inflation expectations were to become less well anchored.  The
second and third sections explain how various indicators can be
used to assess the extent to which inflation expectations remain
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anchored by the monetary policy framework.  And the fourth
and fifth sections discuss various indicators that might be
symptomatic of inflation expectations making inflation more
persistent via changes in price and wage-setting behaviour.
At the end of each section, recent developments in these
indicators are reviewed, to assess whether inflation
expectations appear to have become less well anchored in the
past year.  The latest data suggest that long-term inflation
expectations remain anchored by the monetary policy
framework.  And, although evidence from shorter-term
inflation expectations is more mixed, there are few signs that
inflation expectations have affected price or wage-setting
behaviour.  But the imperfect nature of data and uncertainty
surrounding the metrics used, mean that the analysis below
cannot indicate with certainty the extent to which inflation
expectations remain anchored:  the presence or absence of
evidence is suggestive at best.  Monitoring and assessing these
indicators therefore remain a key area of focus for the MPC.
An accompanying article in this edition of the Bulletin on
pages 111–15, examines what might be learnt from movements
in inflation expectations during past episodes of sustained
off-target inflation across a range of inflation-targeting
countries (Corder and Eckloff (2011)).
Inflation expectations and the monetary
policy framework
The Bank of England’s monetary policy objective is to meet the
Government’s inflation target.(1) But the policy remit
recognises that, in practice, unforeseen events are likely to
cause inflation to depart from the target and that attempts to
prevent such movements in inflation might generate
undesirable volatility in output.  Consequently, the MPC sets
monetary policy so that inflation will return to target in the
medium term.
The MPC is able to meet its monetary policy objective more
easily when inflation expectations are anchored by the
monetary policy framework.  If inflation expectations are
anchored, in the sense that deviations of inflation from target
are expected to be transitory, then companies and households
are likely to set prices and wages in a way that will help to limit
the extent to which any deviation in inflation persists.
Conversely, if inflation expectations were to become less well
anchored, deviations of inflation from target might trigger
changes in price-setting and wage-setting behaviour that make
those deviations more persistent.  If inflation was to rise above
target, that would mean that the MPC would have to tighten
monetary policy by more than it otherwise would do to return
inflation to target, other things being equal, which would
result in a lower level of demand.  The box on page 102
explains in more detail how inflation expectations may be
formed and what it means for them to be anchored.
Assessing whether long-term inflation
expectations remain anchored
If individuals’ expectations about inflation in the long term
were to become less well anchored to the inflation target, then
that might become apparent in at least one of three ways.
First, the level of long-term inflation expectations might move
away from the target.  Second, long-term inflation
expectations might become more responsive to developments
in the economy.  And third, uncertainty about future inflation
might increase.  This section discusses how different indicators
might point to these symptoms materialising and reviews the
latest data to assess whether long-term inflation expectations
have become less well anchored to the target.
The level of long-term inflation expectations
A range of data provides information about the level of
inflation expected by different groups, such as households,
professional forecasters and financial market participants, in
the longer term.  For example, surveys of households and
professional forecasters ask respondents about expected
inflation.  And instruments traded in financial markets, such as
inflation swaps or conventional and index-linked bonds, can
give an indication of the long-term rate of inflation expected
by financial market participants.
These different indicators have relative advantages and
disadvantages for assessing whether long-term expectations
remain anchored.  Although the inflation expectations of
households are likely to have an important influence on the
extent to which the risk from inflation expectations
materialises, for example because of the role they may play in
wage negotiations, survey estimates are difficult to interpret.
It is not clear what measure of inflation households have in
mind when answering the questions.(2) And most of the
surveys have only a short backrun of data, which makes it
difficult to assess what level of reported inflation expectations
would be consistent with inflation being close to target in the
long term.  Surveys of professional forecasters might provide a
more clear-cut or timely signal that inflation expectations
have moved away from target, because the questions ask
specifically about CPI inflation and professionals’ expectations
may lead those of households.(3) But few of the measures go
beyond four years ahead.  Estimates of inflation expectations
(1) Subject to that, the Bank is also tasked with supporting the Government’s economic
objectives, including those for growth and employment.  The MPC seeks to achieve its
objectives by setting the level of Bank Rate and, since March 2009, by purchasing
assets financed by the issuance of central bank reserves.
(2) None of the surveys of households reference a specific inflation measure.  For
example, the Bank/GfK NOP survey asks households what they expect to happen to
‘prices in the shops generally’.
(3) For example, Carroll (2003) shows that households may use information about the
forecasts of professionals in forming their inflation expectations.  Surveys of
professionals might also provide a more reliable indication of long-term inflation
expectations than those of households, because professionals may devote more time
and effort to forecasting inflation, with reputational or financial concerns giving them
stronger incentives to provide a considered response.102 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q2
How inflation expectations may be formed
and what it means for them to be anchored
This box describes how households, companies and financial
markets might form their expectations about inflation in an
economy with an inflation-targeting Monetary Policy
Committee (MPC), and explains what it means for inflation
expectations to be anchored.
It is common in economic models to assume that individuals
form expectations about future inflation using a full set of
information on the state of the economy and a full knowledge
of how the economy operates.  Under so-called ‘rational’ or
‘model-consistent’ expectations, individuals also know the
inflation target objective of the MPC and understand how it
reacts to economic developments.  Assuming that the MPC
shares the same information and view of how the economy
operates, then individuals’ expectations about future inflation
match the path along which the MPC chooses to return
inflation to target.  In that sense, expectations can be said to
be ‘anchored’.
In practice the costs of forming expectations in this way, such
as the time and effort required to collect and process
information and to understand how the economy works, are
very likely to exceed the benefits of doing so for most
individuals.
To avoid these costs, people may instead use simple rules of
thumb to inform their expectations.  There are various rules
that individuals might use.  For example, individuals might
expect inflation to be always at target, or to remain at its
current value.  Individuals may also switch between using
different rules, depending on how well each has performed at
forecasting inflation in the past (Brazier et al (2008)).
There are other ways in which expectations may be formed,
which lie somewhere in between ‘rational’ expectations and
simple rules of thumb.  For example, individuals might reduce
the costs of forming ‘rational’ expectations by acquiring and
processing new information only infrequently.  That might
mean that only a proportion of all individuals may update their
information each period, as in the ‘sticky information’ model
of Mankiw and Reis (2002).  Or individuals might rely on the
media to process new information, rather than doing so
themselves (Carroll (2003)).  Alternatively, while individuals
may not have complete knowledge of how the economy
works, they might learn about the state and structure of the
economy from their recent experiences (Evans and
Honkapohja (2001)).  That could include learning about the
objectives of the MPC:  either its target for inflation and/or its
tolerance of deviations from that target.
However they are formed, inflation expectations could be
defined as being anchored if they are consistent with the
MPC’s inflation-targeting remit.  That is to say, whatever
process drives expectations, it should embody the expectation,
with a reasonable degree of confidence, that inflation will
return to target in the medium term and remain there.
The propensity for inflation expectations to remain anchored is
likely to depend both on the way in which they are formed and
on past outturns of inflation.  As noted above, ‘rationality’
implies that inflation expectations are always anchored when
the MPC pursues a remit to stabilise inflation.  That is in part
because its objectives, by assumption, are fully understood.
If inflation is close to target for an extended period — as it was
in the first ten years of the MPC — then other, simpler, models
of expectation formation are likely to deliver expectations that
are anchored.  For example, if individuals form expectations
using a simple rule of thumb based on past inflation, it seems
likely that a long sequence of inflation outturns close to target
would become embedded such that inflation is always
expected to return to target in the medium term.
But a persistent deviation of inflation from target might cause
inflation expectations to become less well anchored.  For
example, if individuals use their recent experiences to learn
about the objectives of the MPC, that might prompt them to
change their beliefs about the MPC’s ability or willingness to
bring inflation back to target in the medium term, or to think
that the policy committee would return inflation to target
more slowly than in the past.  So a persistent deviation would
become embedded in inflation expectations at least until
inflation returned to target.  In all cases, expectations of
inflation would have become less well anchored.Research and analysis Risk to inflation from inflation expectations 103
derived from financial market instruments are available at
longer horizons.  But these estimates may be influenced by
factors other than inflation expectations.  For example, prices
may be affected by market-specific factors, such as liquidity.(1)
And yields on nominal financial instruments will include a
premium to compensate investors for uncertainty about future
inflation, which may vary over time.
The responsiveness of long-term inflation
expectations to news
If long-term inflation expectations were to become less
well anchored to the target, they may become more
responsive to developments in the economy.  In an
environment of well-anchored inflation expectations,
long-term expectations should not respond systematically
to data outturns, because those outturns have little bearing
on inflation several years ahead.  But if individuals question
the extent to which the MPC will allow developments to have
a persistent effect on inflation, then they may revise their
long-term expectations in response to news about inflation
and the wider economy.
Although the argument holds for any type of economic news,
a simple indicator to monitor is how implied measures of
inflation expectations derived from financial instruments
change in response to information about contemporaneous
CPI inflation (Gürkaynak et al (2006)).(2) Similarly, a
de-anchoring might also become evident in an increase in the
responsiveness of implied measures of longer-term inflation
expectations to changes in shorter-term measures.  If
individuals believe that developments that affect inflation in
the shorter term will also have an effect on inflation in the
longer term, that would tend to increase the correlation
between changes in shorter-term and in long-term
expectations.  That said, changes in the correlation might also
reflect variations in liquidity in the markets for short and
long-maturity instruments.
Uncertainty about inflation in the long term
Even if central expectations of long-term inflation do not
change, individuals may become less certain about how the
MPC will react to current or future developments in the
economy that push inflation away from target.  That
uncertainty might manifest itself either in greater
disagreement across individuals about what inflation is
likely to be in the future, or in greater uncertainty for any one
individual about the range of possible outcomes.(3)
But uncertainty about future inflation may change even if
long-term expectations remain anchored, because individuals
may change their views about the size and persistence of
shocks that are likely to affect the economy in the future.  For
example, following the financial crisis, individuals may believe
that further shocks are more likely to occur.  That re-evaluation
of expected future disturbances might cause them to become
more uncertain about the prospects for inflation, even if their
beliefs about the monetary policy framework do not change.
A range of indicators can be used to monitor uncertainty.
Measures of dispersion of inflation expectations, such as the
interquartile range, derived from surveys of households and
professional forecasters, provide evidence on differences in
views across individuals.  The Bank of England’s survey of
forecasters provides evidence on the extent of individual
uncertainty because it asks each forecaster to attach specific
probabilities to a range of different outcomes for future
inflation.  Options prices, which can be used to estimate the
weight that market participants collectively attach to different
future inflation outturns, are likely to contain information
about both:  they will be influenced by the uncertainty of any
one individual trading in the options market and by the
variation in views between different market participants.
Have long-term inflation expectations become less
well anchored recently?
Movements in most measures of longer-term inflation
expectations do not appear to suggest that expectations have
become less well anchored to the target in the past year
(Table A).  Although two of the three survey estimates of
households’ long-term expectations have picked up a little in
that period, all three are within 1 percentage point of their
historical averages.  And the expectations of most professional
forecasters appear to have been broadly stable around the 2%
target in the past twelve months.  Implied measures of
long-term inflation expectations derived from financial
markets have fallen in the past year:  although the levels of
these estimates remain somewhat higher than the 2% target,
that is likely to be because these measures include a premium
to compensate investors for the uncertainty surrounding
future inflation.
In financial markets, there are few signs that implied measures
of long-term inflation expectations have become more
responsive to developments in the economy in the past year.
Between 2004 and 2007, when inflation was around target on
average, implied measures of long-term inflation expectations
derived from gilt yields — referred to as long-term inflation
breakevens — tended to respond very little to news about
contemporaneous CPI on the day of publication of the data
(Chart 2).  And there is no evidence that a positive correlation
has emerged in the most recent twelve-month period.(4)
(1) Another market-specific factor is demand from pension funds for index-linked cash
flows, which has probably pushed up estimates of inflation expectations derived from
financial market instruments since 2006.  For more information, see McGrath and
Windle (2006).
(2) Financial market data are available at a daily frequency.  That makes it easier to isolate
the effect of news on implied measures of inflation expectations derived from
financial market instruments than, say, on survey-based estimates of households’
inflation expectations, which are available at a monthly frequency at best.
(3) For more information on how measures of uncertainty and disagreement are related,
see Boero et al (2008).
(4) The results are the same when looking at the reaction of implied measures of
long-term inflation expectations over two days, rather than just one, and when using
measures derived from swaps, rather than gilts.104 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q2
There is also little evidence that measures of longer-term
inflation expectations derived from inflation swaps have
tended to rise in response to increases in measures of
short-term inflation expectations, either in the period between
October 2004 and 2007, or in the past year (Chart 3).  That
said, the absence of strong correlations cannot provide proof
that responsiveness to news is unchanged, since the estimates
are based on small sample sizes.
Some indicators suggest that uncertainty about future
inflation has risen, but others signal less change.  Measures
derived from option prices, for example, suggest that
uncertainty among financial market participants has increased
since the start of 2010, although it has fallen back somewhat
in the past month (Chart 4).  But the variation in views across
households, as measured, for example, by the interquartile
range of expectations recorded by the YouGov/Citigroup
survey, is at broadly the same level as in 2005.  Results from
Table A Measures of expected long-term inflation
Time Start of Series May 2011 Change over
horizon data average (unless preceding




Bank/GfK NOP(a) 5 years Feb. 2009 3.1 3.3 0.2
Barclays Basix(b) 5 years Aug. 2008 3.8 3.0 -1.1
YouGov/Citigroup(c) 5–10 years Nov. 2005 3.4 3.5 0.4
Surveys of professional forecasters
Bank 3 years May 2006 2.0 2.2 0.0
HM Treasury 4 years Mar. 2006 2.1 2.1 -0.1
Consensus 5–10 years Oct. 2004 2.2 2.5(d) 0.0
Measures derived from financial instruments(e)
Swaps Five-year,
five-year forward Oct. 2004 2.5 2.5 -0.2
Gilts Five-year,
five-year forward Jan. 1985 3.3 2.7 -0.2
Memo:
CPI Jan. 1996 2.0 4.5(d) 0.8
Sources:  Bank of England, Barclays Capital, Bloomberg, Citigroup, Consensus Economics, GfK NOP,
HM Treasury, ONS, YouGov and Bank calculations.
(a) The Bank/GfK NOP survey asks households how much they expect prices in the shops generally to change,
but does not reference a specific index.
(b) The Barclays Basix survey asks households what they expect the rate of inflation to be, but does not
reference a specific index.
(c) The YouGov/Citigroup survey asks households how they expect consumer prices of goods and services to
develop, but does not reference a specific index.
(d) April 2011 data.
(e) Financial instruments are linked to RPI inflation.  The measures shown assume that market participants
expect RPI inflation to be 0.8 percentage points higher than CPI inflation in the long term, around the
average size of the difference over the period from 1996 to 2011.  But there is considerable uncertainty over
financial market participants’ estimates of that difference, for example due to recent changes in the
measurement of clothing and footwear prices in the CPI index.  That means that actual CPI expectations may
differ slightly from these figures.  Change in the past year is calculated as the average in the fifteen working
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Sources:  Bloomberg, ONS and Bank calculations.
(a) Changes are measured as the change in five-year, five-year forward inflation derived from gilt
yields over the day on which CPI data were published.
(b) News in the CPI release is measured as the difference between the data outturn and the
Bloomberg median forecast.
Chart 2 Changes in five-year, five-year forward inflation
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Sources:  Bloomberg and Bank calculations.
(a) The average changes are estimated using the slope coefficients from regressions of daily
changes in instantaneous inflation forward rates at each horizon on the daily change in the
one year ahead instantaneous forward rate.  The instantaneous forward rates are derived
from inflation swaps.
Chart 3 Estimated average changes in forward inflation
rates at different horizons in response to a 1 percentage
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Sources:  Bloomberg, Royal Bank of Scotland and Bank calculations.
(a) Standard deviation of the probability distribution of annual RPI outturns for four to five years
ahead implied by options.
(b) Probability that RPI inflation will be greater than 5% based on average probability
distributions of annual RPI outturns for four to five years ahead implied by options.
Chart 4 Uncertainty about longer-term RPI inflation
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the Bank’s survey indicate that the average level of uncertainty
across individual professional forecasters has increased
(Chart 5):  the probability that respondents on average attach
to inflation being more than 1 percentage point away from the
2% target has been at higher levels in the past year than
before the onset of the financial crisis in 2007.  In addition,
during the past year professional forecasters on average
reported a somewhat higher probability that inflation would
be more than 1 percentage point above the target in the
medium term than they had done in the past.
Assessing whether shorter-term inflation
expectations remain anchored
Even if long-term inflation expectations remain anchored by
the monetary policy framework, temporary deviations of
inflation from target may be expected to persist for longer
than in the past.  For example, that might occur if people were
to believe that the MPC would return inflation to target more
slowly than before, or if they were to expect the shocks hitting
the economy to become more persistent.
This section discusses three pieces of evidence that might be
symptomatic of shorter-term inflation expectations becoming
less well anchored in that sense.  First, a decline in the
influence of the inflation target on shorter-term inflation
expectations.  Second, the size of movements in shorter-term
inflation expectations.  And third, an increase in the
responsiveness of shorter-term inflation expectations to news
about the economic outlook.
The influence of the inflation target on shorter-term
inflation expectations
If shorter-term inflation expectations were to become less well
anchored, then individuals might place less weight on the
inflation target when forming their expectations.  For example,
individuals using simple rules of thumb to forecast inflation
might switch from a rule based primarily on the inflation target
to one that puts more emphasis on past inflation.
Survey data may help to assess how strong an influence the
inflation target has on shorter-term inflation expectations
formation.  For example, the Bank/GfK NOP survey asks
households whether a number of factors, including the
inflation target, are an important consideration when forming
their expectations of inflation in the year ahead.
Movements in shorter-term inflation expectations
The size of movements in shorter-term inflation expectations
may, in some instances, provide evidence of de-anchoring.  If
individuals’ inflation expectations were to become less well
anchored, such that they expected developments in the
economy to have a more persistent effect on inflation than in
the past, then their shorter-term inflation expectations might
change by more than is consistent with those developments.
One way to gauge whether movements in shorter-term
inflation expectations can be explained by recent
developments is to compare those changes with the MPC’s
judgement of how developments in the economy have
affected the outlook for inflation in the near term.  The latter
will be captured by changes in the MPC’s projections for
CPI inflation, published each quarter in the Bank’s Inflation
Report.  But such comparisons may not always be meaningful,
for example because estimates of households’ inflation
expectations do not specifically reference CPI inflation.
An alternative method of assessing whether movements in
inflation expectations appear consistent with developments in
the economy is to use a statistical technique, such as a
structural vector autoregression (SVAR).  The SVAR approach
involves estimating a set of equations where each variable is
regressed on past movements of itself and the other variables
in the system.  Using these equations, changes in each variable
can be decomposed into two sorts:  those that are ‘explained’
by past outturns of the variables in the model;  and those that
are ‘unexplained’.
But an SVAR estimate of the unexplained component of
inflation expectations might become larger even if
expectations remain anchored.  SVAR models typically include
only a small number of macroeconomic variables.  In reality,
however, inflation expectations are likely to be influenced by a
much wider range of factors.  That means that an SVAR model
is unlikely to be able to explain some changes in inflation
expectations that are driven by factors omitted from the
Average probability that inﬂation will be more than
  1 percentage point above target(a)(b)
Average probability that inﬂation will be more than
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(a) Calculated from the probability distributions for inflation in the medium term reported by
forecasters responding to the Bank’s survey.  Forecasters reported probability distributions for
RPIX inflation two years ahead between February 1998 and November 2003;  for
CPI inflation two years ahead between February 2004 and February 2006;  and for
CPI inflation three years ahead from May 2006 onwards.
(b) The inflation target was changed on 10 December 2003 to 2% as measured by the annual
change in the CPI from 2.5% as measured by the annual change in the RPIX.
Chart 5 Uncertainty across professional forecasters
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model.  And so these movements may be captured in the
estimated unexplained component.
The responsiveness of shorter-term inflation
expectations to news
An increase in the responsiveness of shorter-term inflation
expectations to news about the economic outlook might be
indicative of expectations becoming less well anchored.  If
individuals were to expect deviations of inflation from target
to be more persistent, then they may revise their expectations
of inflation in the years ahead when they receive news about a
temporary deviation of inflation from target.
As with longer-term inflation expectations, a simple indicator
to monitor is how shorter-term inflation expectations respond
to news about contemporaneous CPI inflation.  If inflation
expectations were to become less well anchored, it is likely
that the correlation between changes in shorter-term
expectations and CPI news would increase.
Have shorter-term inflation expectations become less
well anchored recently?
Households’ responses to the Bank/GfK NOP survey suggest
that the inflation target remains an important influence on
their one year ahead inflation expectations.  Although
households report that they take a wide range of factors into
account when assessing the prospects for future inflation, it is
not clear that the relative importance of the inflation target
has fallen in the past year (Table B).
Movements in estimates of households’, companies’ and
professional forecasters’ shorter-term inflation expectations
provide mixed signals about the extent to which inflation
expectations remain anchored.  One and two year ahead
inflation expectations have increased by less than the revision
to the Inflation Report central projection (Chart 6).  But the
unexplained component of two year ahead inflation
expectations, estimated using an SVAR, has picked up since the
start of 2009 (Chart 7):  that suggests that some of the recent
increase in medium-term inflation expectations cannot be
explained by the factors included in the SVAR model.  And
financial market implied measures of shorter-term inflation
expectations appear to have become a little more responsive
to news about contemporaneous CPI inflation in the past year
(Chart 8).  But there are large uncertainties around these
estimates, as indicated by the bars in the chart.
Table B Factors cited by households as important when forming
their one year ahead inflation expectations(a)
Percentage of respondents
2009 2010 2011
Inflation in the previous one to six months 86 82 88
Inflation in the previous year or before 83 83 88
Current level of interest rates 68 66 66
Current strength of the UK economy 80 77 80
Inflation target 57 57 65
Reports of inflation in the media 61 55 65
Reports of VAT in the media 49 57 69
Other 41 32 36
Source:  Bank/GfK NOP.






























































































Sources:  Bank of England, Bank/GfK NOP, Barclays Capital, CBI (all rights reserved), Citigroup,
HM Treasury, YouGov and Bank calculations.
(a) Unless otherwise specified.
(b) Based on an average of expectations for inflation from the Bank/GfK NOP, Barclays Basix,
and, for the one year ahead measure, YouGov/Citigroup surveys.  These surveys do not
reference a specific price index and are based on the median estimated price change.
(c) Based on CBI data for the manufacturing, business/consumer services and distribution
sectors, weighted using nominal shares in value added.  Companies are asked about the
expected percentage price change over the coming twelve months in the markets in which
they compete.  Change is between 2010 Q2 and 2011 Q1.
(d) Based on an average of expectations of CPI inflation from the HM Treasury and Bank of
England surveys.
(e) The MPC measure is based on modal projections under market interest rates in the May 2010
and May 2011 Inflation Reports.
Chart 6 Changes in shorter-term inflation expectations














Sources:  Barclays Research, Bloomberg, ONS and Bank calculations.
(a) The SVAR model includes:  CPI inflation, GDP growth, Bank Rate, wages, real oil prices and
two year ahead inflation expectations, measured using the Barclays Basix estimate.  The
model is estimated using data from 1987 Q3 to 2011 Q2.  The swathe is based on estimating
the 16th and 84th percentiles of the distribution around the parameters of the model (these
percentiles are commonly chosen in econometric analysis).
(b) With thanks to Alina Barnett, who carried out this analysis.
Chart 7 SVAR model estimate of the unexplained
component of two year ahead inflation expectations(a)(b)Research and analysis Risk to inflation from inflation expectations 107
Assessing changes in price-setting behaviour
If inflation expectations were to become less well anchored,
that might lead to changes in price-setting behaviour that
cause inflation to be more persistently away from target.  For
example, if companies were to believe that inflation would
remain above target for longer, then they may raise their own
prices for the goods and services that they produce by more, or
more frequently, than they otherwise would.  And, if they were
to expect other businesses to raise prices too, their
expectations of general price inflation might also rise.
Indicators of companies’ general price inflation expectations
and their pricing intentions are limited.  Surveys of businesses,
such as those conducted by the BCC and the CBI, are the main
source of evidence.  But these provide little information about
the extent to which companies’ inflation expectations are
consistent with inflation being close to target in the longer
term, since the survey questions ask how prices are expected
to change in the coming quarter or year only.
The rate of inflation among goods and services for which prices
typically change infrequently might provide an indirect signal
of companies’ inflation expectations.  Not all companies
change their prices at the same frequency.  Businesses in
sectors that experience frequent changes in input costs and
face few costs in changing advertised prices, such as
supermarkets, might change their prices regularly.  Businesses
in sectors that face large costs in changing prices, however,
might change their prices only once in a while.(1) If a company
can change its price only infrequently, then the best price to
set will depend on the range of price and demand conditions
that the company expects to face during the period in which it
is unable to change its price.  Monetary policy will affect both
price and demand conditions.  So if people were to doubt the
MPC’s willingness or ability to return inflation to target, then
companies that can change their prices only infrequently may
raise their prices by more, or more frequently, than they
otherwise would.  That means that changes in the prices of
these ‘sticky price’ goods and services might provide some
information about companies’ expectations of future inflation
and their beliefs about monetary policy more generally.(2)
But it is difficult to interpret these pieces of evidence without
taking into account other factors that influence prices.
Changes in these factors, such as input costs, are likely to
cause companies’ own price and general price inflation
expectations to move in tandem.  For example, when imported
input costs rose following the depreciation of sterling,
companies might have expected to pass on some of the
increase in their costs into their own prices;  and they might
have expected the prices charged by other businesses to rise
too, as they did the same.  That makes it difficult to assess
whether changes in companies’ pricing intentions reflect
changes in their general price inflation expectations or a
separate factor.
Recent developments in price-setting behaviour
Survey estimates of companies’ expectations of inflation in the
very short term have risen in the past year or so, but that could
reflect increases in input costs.  The net percentage balance of
companies expecting their own prices to go up in the next
three months in 2011 Q1 was above its average between
1997 Q2 and 2007 Q4 (Table C).  But a greater-than-average
percentage of businesses also reported that they were facing
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Sources:  Bloomberg and Bank calculations.
(a) The average changes are the estimated slope coefficients from regressions of the change in
instantaneous forward inflation rates at each horizon on news in the CPI release, on the day
on which CPI data were published.
(b) See footnote (b) to Chart 2for the definition of CPI news.
(c) The bars cover two standard errors either side of the estimated slope coefficients for the past
year.
Chart 8 Estimated average changes in instantaneous
forward inflation rates derived from swaps in response to
CPI news(a)(b)(c)
(1) For more information about companies’ pricing decisions, see Greenslade and
Parker (2008) and Bunn and Ellis (2009).
(2) For more information about this method for extracting a signal about companies’
inflation expectations, see Bryan and Meyer (2010).
Table C Companies’ pricing intentions in the next three months
and current pay pressures
Averages
1997 Q2–2007 Q4 2009 2010 2011 Q1
Net percentage balance 
expecting prices to rise 
in the next three months 21 7 23 34
Percentage reporting 
pressure to raise prices 
from material prices 28 32 39 47
Percentage reporting 
pressure to raise prices 
from pay settlements 28 17 20 23
Sources:  BCC, ONS and Bank calculations.108 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q2
More forward-looking indicators provide few signs that
price-setting behaviour has changed in the past year.
Companies reported in 2011 Q1 that they were expecting their
own prices and the general level of prices to rise only modestly
in the next twelve months (Chart 9).  And, over the past few
years, the average rate of inflation among sticky price goods
and services has been broadly stable at about 2%, its average
level since 1997 (Chart 10).  That may indicate that companies
do not expect inflation to remain above target and that they
are setting their prices accordingly.
Assessing changes in wage-setting behaviour
Inflation expectations may affect the persistence of inflation
via changes in wages.  That might occur directly through wage
negotiations.  For example, if employees were to expect
inflation to remain above target, they may demand higher pay
to compensate for the reduced amount of goods and services
that they would be able to purchase with their current wages.
That would put pressure on companies to raise prices.
Alternatively, a rise in wage inflation might be preceded by a
change in price-setting behaviour:  companies might become
more willing to pay higher wages if they were to expect
above-target inflation to persist, because they would expect to
raise the prices that they charge their customers.  Increases in
wages would also be likely to put upward pressure on inflation
by raising spending.
But other factors are also likely to influence wages.  Companies
may pay higher wages if their employees become more
productive.  Or a fall in unemployment might push up wages,
because it decreases the pool of individuals whom employers
could look to use in place of their current employees.  It is not
straightforward to judge how large an effect these factors have
on wages and so estimate the influence of inflation
expectations on wage growth.
Surveys of companies and households may help to isolate the
effect of changes in inflation expectations on wages.  For
example, the BCC surveys ask companies whether they are
currently suffering pressure to raise prices from pay
settlements.  And the February 2011 Bank/GfK NOP survey
included an additional question that asked households
whether they were looking, or planning to look, to increase pay
with their current employer in light of their inflation
expectations.(1)
Surveys might also indicate if companies are more likely to
increase wages because they expect above-target inflation to
persist.  Since 2008 Q2, the CBI surveys have asked companies
how they expect wage costs per employee to change over the
next twelve months, in addition to asking about expected
changes in prices.  If companies were to become more willing
to pay higher wages because they expected to raise the prices
they charged customers, then it is likely that they would revise
up both their expectation of changes in their own prices and
their expectations of changes in wage costs, all other things
constant.  That would tend to generate a positive correlation
between changes in own price inflation expectations and
changes in wage cost inflation expectations across companies
responding to the CBI surveys.
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Sources:  CBI and ONS.
(a) Companies are asked:  ‘What percentage change is expected to occur over the next
twelve months in your own average output price for goods sold into UK markets?’.
(b) Companies are asked:  ‘What percentage change is expected to occur over the next
twelve months in the general level of prices in the markets that you compete in?’.
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Sources:  ONS and Bank calculations.
(a) The CPI basket is divided into twelve subcomponents, based on the classification of individual
consumption according to purpose categories.  These twelve subcomponents were divided
between flexible and sticky price sectors based on the frequency at which the prices of
different types of goods and services change.  These frequencies were calculated from the
price quotes that underpin the monthly CPI, which the ONS makes available to researchers
via its secure Virtual Microdata Laboratory (described in Ritchie (2008)).  The flexible price
sector comprises those components of the basket which change more regularly than the
median frequency and the sticky price sector comprises those components of the CPI basket
in which prices change less often than the median frequency.  The sticky price series excludes
utility prices, which are more likely to be changed due to changes in gas and other
commodity prices rather than developments in the wider economy.
(b) With thanks to Philip Bunn and Colin Ellis for their help with this analysis.
(1) Respondents were also asked if they were taking, or planning to take other actions,
such as looking to increase pay in other ways and shopping around for better value.Recent developments in wage-setting behaviour
Recent data provide little evidence that inflation expectations
are feeding through into wages.  Current wage growth remains
around 2%, some way below its pre-recession average rate
(Table D).  And growth in unit labour costs, which may be a
more relevant measure for companies’ pricing decisions,
weakened throughout 2010, in part reflecting some recovery
in productivity.(1) But it is difficult to judge precisely the extent
to which other factors, such as the rise in unemployment
during the recession, has pushed down current wage growth
and so what offsetting effect inflation expectations may have
had.
There are few signs that households are pushing for higher pay
in response to higher inflation expectations.  Of those working
households that responded to the February 2011 Bank/GfK
NOP survey, only a small percentage indicated that they were
looking to increase pay with their current employer(2)
(Chart 11).  Consistent with that, the percentage of companies
reporting that they were facing significant pressure to raise
prices on account of pay in 2011 Q1 was below its average
during the period between 1997 Q2 and 2007 (Table C).
Companies do not appear to have become more willing to
grant higher wages at the same time as raising prices in recent
months.  Changes in individual companies’ wage inflation
expectations have tended to be only weakly related to changes
in their price inflation expectations in the past couple of years
and there are few signs that those correlations have increased
in the most recent survey (Table E).
Conclusion
A persistent deviation of inflation from target might cause
inflation expectations to become less well anchored by the
monetary policy framework.  For example, individuals might
question whether the MPC remained willing or able to return
inflation to the target in the medium term.  Or, perhaps more
likely, individuals might think that the MPC had become more
tolerant of deviations of inflation from target and, therefore,
would expect inflation to return to target more slowly, even
though their long-term expectations remained anchored.
If inflation expectations were to become less well anchored,
then deviations of inflation from target might trigger changes
in price-setting, wage-setting and spending behaviour that
make inflation more persistent.  That would, other things being
equal, require the MPC to tighten monetary policy by more
than it otherwise would in order to return inflation to target.
The indicators discussed above suggest that long-term
inflation expectations remain anchored by the monetary
policy framework.  And, although evidence from shorter-term
inflation expectations is more mixed, there is little evidence
that they have become significantly de-anchored.  Moreover,
there are few signs that inflation expectations have affected
price or wage-  setting behaviour.
But the imperfect nature of data means that there are large
uncertainties around all of these indicators, which caution
against concluding with confidence that inflation expectations
remain anchored to the target.  The MPC continues to monitor
the indicators set out in this framework closely, and remains
alert to other pieces of evidence that might indicate that the
risk to inflation from inflation expectations is materialising.
Table D Alternative estimates of annual pay growth
Averages(a) 2010 2011
1997–2007 2009 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
Pay settlements(b) 3.3 2.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7
AWE regular pay(c) 4.0 1.7 1.8 1.3 2.2 2.3 2.1
Unit labour costs 2.6 5.9 4.5 1.4 1.2 0.9 n.a.
Sources:  Bank of England, Incomes Data Services, the Labour Research Department, ONS and XpertHR.
(a) Unless otherwise stated.
(b) Average over the past twelve months, based on monthly data (per cent).
(c) Average weekly earnings.  Average since 2001.
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(1) For more detail on recent developments in pay, see Section 4.3 of the May 2011
Inflation Report.
(2) That may underestimate the proportion of employees for whom an increase in
inflation expectations is leading to higher pay demands, since some employees are





















Source:  Bank/GfK NOP survey.
(a) Respondents to the February 2011 Bank/GfK NOP survey were asked which, if any, from a list
of actions they are taking, or planning to take, in light of their expectations of price changes
over the next twelve months.  The list included four actions in addition to those shown on the
chart:  bring forward major purchases;  move savings out of banks or building societies into
other assets such as shares, bonds, housing or gold;  other (unspecified);  and take no action.
Respondents could select up to three actions.
Chart 11 Working households’ planned actions in light of
their short-term inflation expectations(a)
Table E Correlations between changes in companies’ wage
inflation expectations and their price inflation expectations
2008 Q2–2010 Q4 2011 Q1
Own prices 0.18 0.18
General level of prices 0.20 0.20
Sources:  CBI (all rights reserved) and Bank calculations.110 Quarterly Bulletin  2011 Q2
References
Bank of England (2011), Inflation Report, May.
Boero, B, Smith, J and Wallis, K (2008), ‘Uncertainty and
disagreement in economic prediction:  the Bank of England survey of
external forecasters’, The Economic Journal, July, Vol. 118, Issue 530,
pages 1,107–27.
Brazier, A, Harrison, R, King, M and Yates, T (2008), ‘The danger of
inflating expectations of macroeconomic stability:  heuristic
switching in an overlapping-generations monetary model’,
International Journal of Central Banking, June, pages 219–54.
Bryan, M and Meyer, B (2010), ‘Are some prices in the CPI more
forward looking than others?  We think so’, Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland Economic Commentary no. 2010/2.
Bunn, P and Ellis, C (2009), ‘Price-setting behaviour in the
United Kingdom:  a microdata approach’, Bank of England Quarterly
Bulletin, Vol. 49, No. 1, pages 28–36.
Carroll, C D (2003), ‘Macroeconomic expectations of households and
professional forecasters’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Vol. 118, No. 1, pages 269–98.
Corder, M and Eckloff, D (2011), ‘International evidence on inflation
expectations during Sustained Off-Target Inflation episodes’, Bank of
England Quarterly Bulletin, Vol. 51, No. 2, pages 111–15.
Evans, G and Honkapohja, S (2001), Learning and expectations in
macroeconomics, Princeton University Press.
Greenslade, J and Parker, M (2008), ‘Price-setting behaviour in the
United Kingdom’, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Vol. 48, No. 4,
pages 404–15.
Gürkaynak, R, Levin, A and Swanson, E (2006), ‘Does inflation
targeting anchor long-run inflation expectations?  Evidence from
long-term bond yields in the US, UK and Sweden’, Federal Reserve
Bank of San Francisco Working Paper no. 2006-09.
Mankiw, N G and Reis, R (2002), ‘Sticky information versus sticky
prices:  a proposal to replace the New Keynesian Phillips Curve’,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 117, No. 4, pages 1,295–328.
McGrath, G and Windle, R (2006), ‘Recent developments in sterling
inflation-linked markets’, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Vol. 46,
No. 4, pages 386–96.
Ritchie, F (2008), ‘Secure access to confidential microdata:  four
years of the Virtual Microdata Laboratory’, Economic and Labour
Market Review, Vol. 2, No. 5, May.